Have Manchester United improved their midfield?

Manchester United fans have witnessed their club revamp its aging midfield with three new signings. After a failed move for Atalanta midfielder Ederson, the club decided to shop around the Premier League for midfield reinforcements.

Youri Tielemans (€41m) from Aston Villa, Andrey Santos (€56.3m) from Chelsea, and Carlos Baleba (€75.9m) from Brighton were brought in to revitalize the midfield engine room. With a combined transfer fee of €173.2m, United secured these targets at the lower end of their estimated €169m–€216m market valuation. Sensible spending, however, is measured not only by transfer fees, but by tactical need and squad fit.

The question before us now is whether or not Manchester United have solved their midfield issues, and whether this revamp has made them better or worse. In Chart 1, we can see United's midfield last season lacked a great/elite ball winner and carrier. With the departure of Casemiro, the club has also lost an elite B2B midfielder and its only DLP.

The signing of Tielemans replaces a substantial amount of Casemiro's output. This is especially noticeable in deep buildup, as Tielemans' elite deep-lying playmaker (DLP) profile is an improvement on Casemiro's (92 vs. Casemiro’s 88). While his box-to-box rank (83) represents a notable drop-off from Casemiro's elite rank (97), combining him with Bruno Fernandes (88) should provide adequate engine-room coverage.

Santos and Baleba inject elite ball-winning capabilities (91 and 95, respectively) into a side that badly needed defensive bite. Beyond disruptive tackling and intercepting, however, their contributions are limited. Crucially, both share heavily overlapping skill sets, with Baleba profiling very similarly to Manuel Ugarte. This overlap raises a familiar question: did United buy the tactical profiles they actually needed, or simply the players available on the market?

A starting trio of Bruno, Tielemans, and one of Baleba or Santos creates a balanced unit, though it lacks great vertical ball-carrying. The larger tactical issue lies on the bench and the persistent reliance on Bruno's durability. Ugarte, Mason Mount, and the alternate defensive midfielder do not offer the supplementary creativity or press resistance required to alter game states. Rather than providing tactical variation, they act merely as rotational bodies, robbing United of the stylistic flexibility top European clubs possess. The lone wild card is Kobbie Mainoo. Statistically, Mainoo leans heavily toward ball-carrying over primary chance creation. While his baseline output is still developing, his ceiling makes him the most viable candidate to provide that missing dynamic.

United also appear to have gone another window without planning for Bruno's eventual decline or departure. None of the recruits serve as a direct replacement, leaving the squad vulnerable to injury. Tielemans provides a partial safety net: while stylistic differences are obvious, he possesses passing range and tempo control previously unique to Bruno in this squad. Even as a secondary creator (rating 88), there is still a noticeable drop-off from Bruno's generational playmaking. Given the scarcity of direct Bruno equivalents, United should have explored pairing Tielemans with an additional creative specialist rather than stockpiling defensive ball-winners.

For this setup to succeed, younger assets like Mainoo, Santos, and Baleba must take developmental leaps, while Bruno and Tielemans maintain peak physical availability. United have lowered the midfield's average age while maintaining veteran stability. Tielemans in particular will need to absorb Casemiro's role as the vocal midfield organizer.

Ultimately, revamping the engine room in this manner highlights United's longstanding structural defect: reactive rather than proactive squad building. Waiting until a position reaches critical deficiency forces two costly outcomes: it cannibalizes budgets meant for other positions, and it forces panic-buying based on market availability over tactical cohesion. Instead of identifying opportunities early, United continually diagnose problems late and scramble for fixes. Until the sporting department transitions from fire-fighting to proactive roster construction, the club will struggle to compete at the level it aspires to.

Ballity Editorial